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INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN
COMMERCIAL 'CONTRACTS
By Robert Whitman*
INTRODUCTION
To complement the explosive development of modern
business the use of commercial contracts has greatly ex-
panded, and these documents have grown into intricate,
detailed, hypertechnical expositions.' The doctrine of in-
corporation by reference alleviates this complexity by
allowing a reference to incorporate into the agreement
extrinsic materials which are given equal weight with
provisions directly contained therein.2 Parties utilizing
such an incorporation, may have the advantages of (1)
speed and efficiency in the drawing of contracts; (2)
stereotyped clauses which can be applied on innumerable
occasions to achieve uniformity; (3) greater skill and care
in the drafting of clauses to be incorporated, producing in
turn, a clearer and more complete statement of intent;
(4) certainty as to meaning and effect of incorporated
terms after an initial construction by the courts; and (5)
retention of the basic provisions of the contract in con-
venient form.
On the other hand, employment of an incorporation by
reference has the potential of causing undesirable results.
A court can misinterpret an ambiguous or inadequate state-
* B.B.A. 1956. LL.B. 1959, Columbia University; Assistant Professor
of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
"In general this work is confined to a consideration of incorporation
of written material into a written contract. The doctrine of incorporation
by reference is not so limited. As long as the statute of frauds is not
violated an oral or written contract can validly incorporate an oral or
written reference. See Womble v. -Hickson, 91 Ark. 266, 121 S.W. 401
(1909) (house to be built as duplicate of another) ; American Mercantile
Exchange v. Blunt, 120 Me. 128, 66 A. 212 (1906) (written contract re-
ferring to a "system" which was orally explained) ; American Barge
Line Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 179 Tenn. 156, 163 S.W. 2d
502, 505 (1942) (oral contract referred to "the usual and customary ar-
rangement" which was explained orally). Cf. Annotation, 73 A.L.R. 1383
(1931).2 B.g., Enochs v. Christie, 137 Cal. App. 2d 887, 291 P. 2d 200 (1955);
Stanley v. New, 56 N.M. 756, 250 P. 2d 893 (1952).
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ment as the reflection of either the presence or absence of
an intent to incorporate, or the desired scope of the refer-
ence may be misconstrued. An indiscriminate use of in-
corporation may create conflicts between contract pro-
visions. Finally, incorporation discourages careful scrutiny
of all the contract's terms with a consequent unequal ad-
vantage for one of the contracting parties.
Regardless of this formidable list of undesirable cir-
cumstances which may stem from incorporation, the doc-
trine's use will undoubtedly continue to thrive. How, then,
can a draftsman utilize the advantages of a reference while
minimizing its adverse effects? How will these incorpora-
tions be treated by the courts?
The difficulties brought before the court when a refer-
ence is at issue arise from the assertion of conflicting
intents by the contracting parties. While a court is likely
to lean towards a ruling which will uphold the parties'
agreement if the existence of the disputed incorporation is
essential to the finding of a contract which was intended,"
it must also attempt to avoid allowing a party to obtain an
unfair advantage by employing a reference. In judging
each case the court will be applying both the general rules
of contract law and those rules dealing particularly with
the doctrine of incorporation by reference. So, the court
may have several theories to choose from in order to
reach a desirable decision when it faces the major prob-
lem areas of incorporation which are considered below.
MANIMSATION OF INTENT
When the meaning of the words adopted by the parties
is disputed, the intent of the contractors at the time they
entered into their agreement is sought by the court.
1. Intent to Incorporate
No specific language is necessary to bring about an
incorporation by reference, but if the parties do not ex-
pressly demonstrate an intent to incorporate in the body
of the contract,4 they will place upon the court the burden
8 Presumably the expressions of the parties would be interpreted ut res
magi8 valeat. In an overwhelming number of cases where reference
materials are in issue, however, their contents are not essential to the
finding of a contract.
' If a writing recites that it is part of another agreement which makes
no mention of incorporation, an incorporation may not be found since
the preliminary question of intent should be answered from the body of
the contract itself. Spence v. Central Acc. Ins. Co., 236 11. 444, 86 N.E.
104 (1908) (application for insurance not incorporated into policy). See
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of validating their desired incorporation by finding an
implied intent.5 A clear manifestation of an intention to
incorporate, (e.g., "This contract is subject to [description
of incorporated materiali which by reference is incorpo-
rated as a part of this agreement,") 6 will eliminate any
doubt as to the intent of the parties. But often statements
of intent are vague and ambiguous, and must then be con-
strued by the court.'
In construing such statements courts consider the na-
ture of the transaction involved. In a contract between a
subcontractor and a general contractor, a presumption
prevails that the subcontractor undertakes to do his work
subject to the conditions and limitations in the agreement
between the principal contractor and the owner. Conse-
quently, little evidence is required to find an incorporation
of the terms of a general contract in a sub-contract.8 Con-
versely, in different situations it -has been said that to find
that the terms of another document were intended to be
incorporated into an agreement, a reference must be clear
and unequivocal.
While a court's decision depends upon the facts of the
particular case, there are several principles which can be
considered in determining intent. A finding of incorpora-
tion is bolstered by the fact that the incorporated materials
supplement and enhance the meaning of incomplete con-
tract terms, rather than conflict with complete provisions."
aleb American Employers Ins. Co. v. Raton Wholesale Liquor Co., 123
F. 2d 283 (10th Cir. 1941) (application for fidelity bonds) ; Sohn v. New
York Indemnity Co., 340 Ill. 129, 172 N.E. 57 (1930) (insurance applica-
tion). But where the court regards a contract as ambiguous such a
reference would make it easier to find an intent to incorporate. See text
at note 20, infra.
5 If a reference is not found, under the parol evidence rule the extrinsic
materials which bear on the contract would not be admissible as evidence
if they varied or modified, the contract. E.g., Brown-Randolph Co. v.
Gude, 151 Ga. 281, 106 S.E. 161 (1921).
6 E.g., Valley Construc. Co. v. City of Calistaga, 72 Cal. App. 2d 839,
165 P. 2d 521 (1946); Level Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken Co., 305 N.Y. 82,
111 N.E. 2d 218 (1953), rev'g. 280 App. Div. 211, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 549 (1952).
1 See United States Rubber Products v. Clark, 145 Fla. 631, 200 So.
385 (1941) (lack of sufficient description); Brown-Randolph v. Gude,
151 Ga. 281, 106 S.E. 161 (1921). Oompare Spence v. Central Acc. Ins.
Co., 236 Ill. 444, 86 N.E. 104 (1908), with Gaines v. Fidelity & Oas. Co.
of N.Y., 188 N.Y. 411, 81 N.E. 169 (1907).
'E.g., 'Granette Products Co. v. Arthur H. Neumann & Co., 200 Iowa
572, 203 N.W. 935 (1925); Hartwell v. Friechnder, 217 S.W. 231 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1920).
'Scott's Valley Fruit Exchange v. Growers Refrigeration Co., 81 Cal.
App. 2d 437, 184 P. 2d 183, 189 (1947). See Cordle v. Sheaf, 104 N.E. 2d
455 (Ct. App. Ohio 1950).
"Frierson v. International Agricultural Corp., 24 Tenn. App. 616, 148
S.W. 2d 27, 35 (1940).
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An intent to incorporate is suggested if both the contract
and the reference material were executed on the same day
and drawn by the same parties.1 Attachment of supple-
mentary materials to the contract at its inception, is also
a strong indication that an incorporation was intended. 2
When another contract is merely mentioned in an agree-
ment, it is questionable whether there was an intent to
incorporate. Is the citation to this other instrument for
descriptive purposes only, or is there an intent to adopt
its provisions and import them into the agreement? For
example, a promissory note, otherwise negotiable, may
be read as containing a provision making it subject to the
terms of an extrinsic agreement which thereby renders
it non-negotiable. Or, the same reference may be inter-
preted as merely indicating that an extrinsic contract was
at the origin of the transaction which gave rise to the
instrument, and this would not impair its negotiability. 4
A vexing situation arises when an earlier contract is
alluded to in a second agreement between the same parties.
In Government Personnel Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wear, 5
Wear, a former employee of the insurance company, sued
to recover commissions. After trial the court disregarded
answers of the jury which were favorable to the insurance
company and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. On
appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas considered
the three contracts involved which had all been executed
on July 1, 1946.
Under contract No. 1, between Wear and the company,
Wear was authorized to solicit insurance policies on a
commission, basis. Contract No. 3, between one Earl and
the company, similarly authorized Earl to solicit insurance.
Contract No. 2, between Wear and the company, was
entitled "Supplemental Agreement" and provided in part
that "the company agrees to pay Gordon Wear the fol-
lowing commission on (premiums paid for)16 life insur-
"Lapp v. Loufek, 113 F. Supp. 65 (Minn. 1953).
IsAssociates Discount Corp. v. Greisinger, 103 F. !Supp. 705 (W.D. Pa.
1952).
See Annotation, 104 A.L.R. 1378 (1936).
"E.g., Strand Amusement Co. v. Fox, 205 Ala. 183, 87 So. 332 (1921)("as per contract") ; Cook v. Park, 47 Ga. App. 749, 169 S.E. 208 (1933) ;
Tyler v. Whitney Central Trust & Savings Bank, 157 La. 249, 102 So. 325(1924) ("as per lease"); Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45(1928) (bonds refer to trust mortgage). 'See UNnWORM COMMICMAL CODE(1958) § 3-105. But see, e.g., Allison v. Hollenbeak, 139 Iowa 479, 114
N.W. 1059 (1908) (payee agrees to look to mortgage security for payment);
Sloan v. McCarty, 134 Mass. 245 (1883).
247 S.W. 2d 284 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
"The parties agreed that the words inserted parenthetically by the
court were intended. Id., 285.
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ance contracts issued by said company on insurance
written (solicited) by C. H. Earl under his contract dated
July 1, 1946.' 17
One of the questions"8 to be decided on appeal was the
date contract No. 2 was terminated. It was the company's
contention that it was ended by oral notice given to Wear
in October 1947. Wear contended that the contract did
not terminate until thirty days after written notice of
cancellation was given to him on May 28, 1948.
Contract No. 2 did not contain a provision for written
notice of termination, but it was argued that paragraph X
of contract No. 1, which provided for termination, only
upon thirty days written notice, was incorporated into
contract No. 2.1' In support of an incorporation by refer-
ence were the facts that contract No. 2 was styled a
"Supplemental Agreement" and that contract No. 1 ex-
pressly provided in paragraph XVI that "this agreement,
together with any amendments thereto duly executed con-
stitutes the entire contract between the parties. "20
The majority of the court found contracts No. 1 and
No. 2 to be separate and complete instruments which were
in no way linked together. The trial court had concluded
that they were one agreement, and the dissent, on appeal,
was of the same opinion, finding that contract No. 1 looked
forward to possible amendments and that it had been
agreed that these would be considered a part of the
original contract. Moreover, the dissent pointed out that
contract No. 2 was not in conflict with any provisions of
the prior contract but was rather a necessary complement
of that instrument.21
The majority felt it was of little or no importance that
the contracting parties had named contract No. 2 a "Sup-
plemental Agreement" since the heading the parties agreed
17Supra, n. 15, 285. The majority opinion gives no reason for the
necessity of a "Supplemental Agreement." The dissenting opinion states,
"The insurance company, for reasons of Its own, did not want Earl to
know that Wear was making money on Earl's services." Id., 293.
IA claim that Wear was entitled to recover commissions on policies
solicited by subagents of Earl was unanimously rejected by the court on
appeal.
19 Wear also contended that since the two contracts related to the
same subject matter and were executed between the same parties on the
same day, contract No. 2 should be read and construed together with
contract No. 1. The Court assumed for argument that the contracts
should be construed together but pointed out that this fact 'alone, without
an incorporation by reference, would not justify placing a paragraph from
No. 1 into No. 2. The dissent agreed with this analysis. See supra, n. 15,
286,294.
Supra, n. 15, 286.
2Id., 293.
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upon was not a part of the contract, and the agreement
did not indicate what it supplemented.22 The dissent
logically queried what, if not the original agreement, could
or did contract No. 2 supplement. It reasoned that the
parties by a title selected by themselves showed contract
No. 2 was to complete something that had gone before,
and while the name the parties selected for the document
could not control, there was no reason to render these
words meaningless since they symbolized the ideas of the
persons using them.23
22Id., 287. The court further stated that "It is much more important
what the instrument when read within its four comers provides than the
name the parties who were not lawyers gave it."
2 Id., 293. The court next asserted that if contract No. 2 was to be-
come a part of contract No. 1 and be governed by It, the parties would
have go provided in their Instrument. The dissent countered by arguing
that the absence in the second agreement of clauses which had already been
adequately settled evidenced an understanding that the two agreements
were one. 'See note 89, infra.
The court concludes Its argument on this issue by asserting that Wear
Is at most raising a question of fact which he has waived by failing to
raise the Issue of the Intention of the parties. The dissent does not
directly reply but apparently assumes that the question before the court
is to be decided as a matter of law.
The majority of the court went on to justify its holding on an alterna-
tive ground. It said contract No. 2 provided that Wear was to have
obtained commissions under Earl's contract dated July 1, 1946. Earl and
the Company agreed to terminate their contract December 31, 1947, and
operate under a new contract. Therefore, when Earl's contract of July 1,
1946, was terminated, Wear's rights to commissions on insurance there-
after written by Earl came to an end.
The dissent countered this argument by asserting that the change in
Earl's contract could not work a corresponding change in Wear's contract
where Wear had not agreed to It. Wear's contract provided for its com-
plete cancellation on thirty days written notice and insofar as he was
concerned It could only be terminated by such communication.
Nowell, J., in a concurring 'opinion rested his decision in favor of the
company on the jury's decision that Wear was estopped from contending
that his commissions did not end on January 1, 1948. Relying heavily
upon Humble Oil & Refining Company v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.
2d 355 (1947), Judge Nowell found that Wear did not protest nonpayments
and that his conduct was calculated to and did lead the company to
believe that he had acquiesced in its construction of the contract for it
was only after Wear's connection with the company h'ad ceased that he
asserted his claim. This -analysis was augmented by a finding that the
provisions of the contract were ambiguous, so that parol evidence of the
reasonable interpretation of the company could be admitted. Supra, n. 15,
289-92.
In reply to this estoppel argument the dissent claimed that Wear simply
remained silent at a time when there was no duty to speak. The Insur-
ance company in effect only told Wear that some time in the future,
when it sent written notice, a change would be made. Wear did not have
to remind the company that its rights were controlled by a written con-
tract. The dissent further agreed with the trial court, which, in dis-
regarding the jury findings on estoppel, queried how Wear's later conduct
could have put the company in an Injurious position In making its
earlier contract with Earl. At the earliest, Wear was orally notified in
October, and by September the company had already arranged a new
contract with Earl. Id., 297.
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The court in the Wear case seemed little inclined to
allow Wear a recovery of close to five thousand dollars24
because of a technicality. Still, if an incorporation by refer-
ence had been found, the contracts would have been consid-
ered as one, and the court would have had to base a denial
of recovery on some general rule of contract law. Rather
than resting upon such a general rule, the majority of the
court chose to rely on the rule that an intent to incorporate
must be found, backing this up with an alternative propo-
sition.2" It seems appropriate that the court emphasized
the "intention to incorporate" problem, for the difficulty
in the case arose from the fact that an executive of the
insurance company responsible for giving notice of ter-
mination only read the "Supplemental Agreement" and
did not then peruse contract No. 1.26
2. Matters Incorporated
Along with an expressed intent to incorporate, the
parties must clearly identify which materials they are
incorporating,27 how much of them are being referred to,28
and the purpose for which the reference is made.29
Regardless of size, virtually anything that can be
written into a contract can be incorporated therein by
reference.30 Indeed, matters presently not in existence
which could not be detailed in a contract, can be made a
part of it by reference.3 Commercial contracts often in-
corporate trade association rules or the by-laws of a cor-
" Supra, n. 15, 289, 298.
2 See note 23, supra.
Supra, n. 15, 297.
" If it is found that the parties intended an incorporation, parol evidence
as to which materials they meant to refer to can be submitted to make
definite that which was indefinitely expressed. E.g., Helm v. Speith, 298
Ky. 225, 182 S.W. 2d 635 (1944) ; Love v. Damper, 159 Miss. 430, 132 So.
439 (1931) ; Le Marinel v. 'Bach, 114 Wash. 651, 196 P. 22 (1921).
"See Hill & Combs v. First National Bank of San Angelo, 139 F. 2d
740 (5th Cir. 1944) ; Berke Moore Co. Inc. v. Phoenix Bridge Co., 98
N.H. 261, 98 A. 2d 150 (1953).
21 See Helm v. 'Speith, 298 Ky. 225, 82 S.W. 2d 635 (1944) (F.H.A. plans
not only adopted for purpose of obtaining loan) ; Rossi v. Douglas, 203
Md. 190, 100 A. 2d 3 (1953) (plat not incorporated merely to indicate
new buildings) ; Alexander v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 232 MIss. 629, 100
So. 2d 347 (1958) (subcontractor's Incorporation of general contract did
not include obligation ,to pay attorneys fees).
8 But see note 71, infra. A simple contract cannot incorporate a spe-
cialty, 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1936) § 628, 1802. Cf. Huylers
v. Ritz Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co. of Atlantic City, 1 F. 2d 491
(Del. 1924). For restrictions on incorporating by reference in a testa-
mentary disposition, see, 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY (1958) § 627.
alPerry v. United States, 146 F. 2d 398 (5th Cir. 1945) (plans and
specifications) ; Rossi v. Douglas, 203 Md. 190, 100 A. 2d 3 (1953) (plat)
Kachurn v. Barr, 272 App. Div. 391, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 629 (1947).
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poration. If there is an incorporation of the specific rules
in existence at the time of the making of a contract,
those provisions will govern the rights of the parties
regardless of a later amendment of the rules. It is just as
easy, however, to incorporate the set of rules and any later
changes that may be adopted.
32
If an incorporation is stated to be for a specified pur-
pose, it will only become a part of the contract for that
limited use.33 But if extrinsic documents are referred to
without limiting words, in the absence of evidence of
a contrary intent, it will be presumed that the parties
meant to incorporate all these materials without restric-
tion.34 Certainly, if by their reference the parties intend
to limit express provisions of the contract or extend the
scope of the contract into areas which are not covered
within its body, this desire must be made obvious, 3 for
if a segment of the main contract settles a particular issue,
reference material generally referred to will not nor-
mally be considered applicable to change that provision.3
In Lusk v. Lyon Metal Products Inc.," Lusk sued Lyon
for commissions allegedly due under a written contract.
The trial court initially directed a verdict for plaintiff but
thereafter, on defendant's motion, set aside that judgment
and alternatively ordered entry of judgment for defendant
or a new trial.
The agreement between the parties read in part as
follows:
"Memorandum Governing Sales Upon Commission.
"Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T. Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 174 P.
2d 441 (1946). See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Division, 358 U.S. 103, rehearing den. 358 U.S. 942 (1958). Cf.
Annotation, 33 A.L.R. 2d 1118, 1128 (1954).
' E.g., Guerini Stone Oo. v. P. 3. Carlin Construction Co., 240 U.S.
264 (1915) ; Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. American Surety Co., 66 Ga. 805,
19 S.E. 2d 357 (1942).
' See Frommeyer v. L. R. Construction Co., 261 F. 2d 879 (3rd Cir. 1958).
Even where a reference for general purposes is found, Incorporated ma-
terials merely suggesting a course of action will not be given effect in the
absence of a specific election to make such provisions mandatory. C. G.
Trading Oorporation v. Sun-Fast Textiles Inc., 201 N.Y.S. 883 (Sup. Ct.
1900).
Inland Engineering & Const. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 76 Utah 435,
290 P. 367, 375 (1930).
"Perry v. United States, 146 F. 2d 398 (5th Cir. 1945); Wilson v.
Keefe, 150 Cal. App. 2d 178, 309 P. 2d 516 (1957); Krause v. Oscar
Daniels Co., 61 Ohio App. 337, 22 N.E. 2d 544 (1939).
1' 247 S.W. 2d 617 (Sup. Ct. Mo. 1952).
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Products as follows: All products covered in the
Steel Equipment Division Price, Policy and Procedure
Book. * * *
Commission - Rates as set out in the Company
Manual hereinafter referred to.
The Company will lend its Manual containing price,
policy and procedure data, also current rates of com-
missions. Notice of changes in such Manual will be sent
from time to time as the Company may determine.
This Manual shall be returned immediately upon re-
quest of the Company or upon the termination of this
apppointment." 8
The orders plaintiff secured under this agreement were
accepted by the company but were later cancelled by the
purchasers and did not result in sales for the defendant.
Section 9 of the Company Manual disallowed commissions
on cancelled orders by providing that commissions were
to be credited when orders were shipped subject to de-
duction if goods were returned.
On appeal by plaintiff the issue submitted was whether
or not this provision of defendant's Manual had been in-
corporated within the agreement between the parties.
Plaintiff argued for a limited incorporation; i.e., that the
amount of plaintiff's commissions under the contract provi-
sions was to be calculated in accordance with Section 8
of the Company Manual, entitled "Commission Rates."
The court noted that the memorandum did not expressly
provide that the provisions of the contract should be
governed and controlled at all times by the Manual, yet
it still found that all of the provisions of the Manual had
been incorporated into the agreement.8 9 The court ques-
tioned why the defendant was to "lend" its entire Manual
to the plaintiff unless the parties meant to be bound by
its provisions.4" It also reasoned that the wide variety of
questions which would arise under the contract would not
be covered by the short memorandum but would be an-
swered by the Company Manual and that this showed an
intent to have all the Manual's provisions clarify the
language of and define the terms used in the memo-
randum. 1
The Court in the Lusk case did not have a general rule
of contracts which it could have alternatively applied to
Id., 618.
'RId., 621.
,Id., 621.Id., 622.
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the facts of the case in order to reach its decision. The
sole question before the court was the scope of the refer-
ence intended by the parties. By viewing the overall
circumstances surrounding the transactions between the
parties and refusing to read the clause of the contract in
isolation, the court was able to find an entire incorporation
of the Manual for general purposes although an explicit
intention to obtain this result was totally absent from the
contract.
In State v. Black,42 plaintiff entered into an employment
contract with the Board of Education of Mount Pleasant
Special School District. The contract provided in Section 3
that her salary was to be paid monthly; in Section 4 that
she agreed to "observe and enforce" the school laws
of the state of Delaware, the Rules and Regulations of the
State Board of Education and the Mount Pleasant Special
School District;" and in Section 5 that either party could
terminate the contract by giving thirty days' written notice.
Plaintiff resigned her teaching position after three months
and failed to receive payment of full salary for her last month
of teaching. Defendant argued that upon the giving of
notice of resignation, plaintiff's contract was converted
from an agreement to pay compensation on a monthly basis
to a per diem basis. Under the terms of the Rules and
Regulations of the State Board of Education, employees
paid on a per diem basis were not entitled to compensation
when school was not in session because of construction
repairs and Christmas vacation.
On appeal from a decision in favor of defendant, the
court found that the contract, clearly requiring compen-
sation by the month, lid not incorporate the general Rules
and Regulations for the purpose of abridging its terms.
The words "observe and enforce" merely connoted an
agreement by the teacher to abide by all regulations bear-
ing on the conduct of a school teacher in the execution of
her duties.44
The court was impressed with the fact that the salary
agreement had already been clearly set forth in. the con-
tract itself.40 Applying the doctrine of incorporation by
reference here would be "rather harsh" since at the sign-
ing of the agreement plaintiff, who was unversed in
affairs of business, was handed a pamphlet containing the
"146 Del. (7 Terry) 295, 83 A. 2d 678 (1951).
43 (7., 679-80.
44 Id., 681.
,5 Id., 682.
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Rules of the School District but not those of the State
Board of Education." Plaintiff virtually conceded defeat
if the Rules and Regulations of the State Board had been
generally incorporated. 7 To avoid applying the reference
material in this case the court could find a total absence of
an incorporation by reference, or it could find that the
incorporation was for a limited purpose only. By assuming
"without deciding, that the words 'observe and enforce'
clearly demonstrate an intention to incorporate by refer-
ence,"48 it chose to rest its decision upon the latter theory.
3. Conflicting Clauses
Where materials incorporated into the contract are
repugnant to provisions in the body of the instrument,
which provisions did the parties intend to be controlling?
It would be wrong to state as a rule that the provisions
in the main instrument control. For one thing, in many
reference situations there is no one document which can
be termed the "main" contract which refers to an extrinsic
source.
If a note is executed together with a mortgage, each in-
strument is likely to refer to the other. Here the note is said
to be the primary evidence of the obligation, and so it over-
rides provisions in direct conflict within the mortgage. 49
In the absence of analogous reasoning which will enable
a court to state such a broad rule, all of the materials in-
volved are construed as a whole. A court looks for a way
to reconcile the seemingly repugnant provisions, or, if this
cannot be done, to determine which one of the provisions
should be made effective in order to carry out the primary
intention of the parties.50
If an inconsistency lies between a clause that is broadly
inclusive and one that is limited, the more specific clause will
normally be held to modify the general statement, for the
intention of the parties is likely to be found in the clause
which particularly deals with the issue.51 And whether
-Id., 681.
7 Id., 680.
IId., 681.
"Annotation, Conflict Between Provisions of Note and Conditional Sale
Instrument in Connection With Which Note is Given, 143, A.L.R. 591
(1943). But cf. 6 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 66, § 26. 'See also Annotation,
Inconsistency Between Description of Land in Instruments Conveying
Same or Affecting Title Thereto and Description in Another Instrument
Referred to Therein, 134 A.L.R. 1041 (1941).
E.g., Arrow Sheet Metal Works v. Byrant & Detwiler Co., 338 Mich.
68, 61 N.W. 2d 125 (1953); Idalou Cooperative Cotton Gin v. iGue, 317
S.W. 2d 240, 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
aE.g., Perry v. Bushwell, 113 Me. 399, 94 A. 483 (1915); Birnbaum v.
Jamestown Mut. Ins. Co., 298 N.Y. 305, 83 N.E. 2d 128 (1948).
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it appears in the main body of the contract or in a reference,
a conflicting subsidiary provision is not interpreted as
overriding the "dominant purpose" of the contract. In an
English case where an oil tanker was chartered and the
bill of lading was subject to the provisions of the
"Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States," and
Section 5 of the Act made it inapplicable to charter par-
ties, the House of Lords held that the parties effectively
intended to incorporate the provisions of the United States
Act into their contract. The restrictive language in Sec-
tion 5 was rejected as meaningless. 2
When a statutory provision is incorporated into a con-
tract, it will prevail over a conflicting provision of the
contract if that construction will accomplish the purpose
the law was intended to serve.5 3 By deciding to incor-
porate a statute into the contract, the parties make its
words their own. If evidence is presented that the parties
understood the effect of the words to be different from that
intended by the men who drafted them, the interpretation
which the parties adopted would govern. But if a legisla-
ture specified that the provision should be included in every
contract of a particular class, such a statute would be
prescribing its legal operation and would have to be given
effect in accordance with the intention of the legislature
regardless of how the parties understood it. 54
It can be seen that in dealing with conflicts that arise
when a reference has been made, general contract rules
are applied and the presence of an incorporation is only
one factor which the courts will consider.
ADEQUACY OF DIscLosuRE
Along with, or in place of disputing the meaning of
words used within the contract, a party may attack a
reference by claiming that he had never been shown nor
been made aware of the contents of the incorporated ma-
terials.
General contract law provides that in the absence of
misrepresentation a party is held to the terms of a con,
mAdamastos Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., Ltd.,
[1958] 2 W.L.R. 688, noted Journal of Bus. Law 139, 143 (1959).
5Board of School Com'rs. v. Hahn, 246 Ala. 662, 22 So. 2d 91 (1945);
Hlpp v. Prudential Casualty & Surety Co., 60 S.D. 300, 244 N.W. 346(1932); Jones v. Preferred Ace. Ins. Co., 226 Wis. 423, 275 N.W. 897(1937). See UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODn (1958) § 2-318.
51 Lloyd v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 67 Ohio App. 89, 36 N.E. 2d
67 (1941).
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tract into which he has entered, whether he has read them
or not.5 And generally, incorporated materials need not
be signed by the parties 6 or annexed to the incorporating
document57 to become part of the contract. In fact, where
a written contract expressly recites that a copy of incor-
porated materials is to be annexed 8 or signed by a party,5 9
an omission to carry out the recital would not invalidate the
reference if one of the parties had not been prejudiced.
Even the failure to prepare materials which were to have
been annexed to the contract has been held immaterial
where the contract contains a sufficient amount of data
within its body to govern equitably the rights of the par-
ties.60
The combined effect of these rules would render value-
less the plea that a party failed to see or know the contents
of the extraneous documents under consideration. Adop-
tion of this rationale has given effect to incorporated
provisions which contained arbitration clauses," time
schedules for completing work,62 financing arrangements,63
building requirements,64 short statutes of limitations,"
and limitations of liability.66
13 CoRBN, CONTRACTS (1960) § 607, 656. See, e.g., Bowser v. Hamilton
Glass Co., 207 F. 2d 341 (7th Cir. 1953) ; Re Estate of Holtorf, 224 Minn.
220, 28 N.W. 2d 155, 157 (1947).
5White v. McLaren, 151 Mass. 553, 24 N.E. 911 (1890).
v1E.g., United States v. Outer Harbor Dock & Warf. Co., 124 F. Supp. 337
(Cal. 1954); Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros., 201 Md. 115, 93 A. 2d
272 (1952).
" New England Iron Co. v. Gilbert El. R. Co., 91 N.Y. 153, 164-65
(1893); Goddard v. Morgan, 193 Wash. 83, 74 P. 2d 894 (1937). See
Boyd v. Miller, 210 Iowa 829, 230 N.W. 851 (1930); Bowers v. Ocean
Acci. & Guarantee Corp., 110 App. Div. 691, 97 N.Y.S. 485 (1906), aff'd.
187 N.Y. 561, 80 N.E. 1105 (1907). Cf. Billet v. Penn. Fire Ins. Co.,
101 N.J.L. 546, 129 A. 209, 211-12 (1925) (waiver of attachment by insur-
ance company).
5Lennon v. Smith, 14 Daly 520, 1 N.Y.S. 520 (1888) (party stated
signing stipulated by contract was unnecessary).
0Womble v. Hickson, 91 Ark. 266, 121 S.W. 401 (1909).
61 Level Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken & Co., 305 N.Y. 82, 111 N.E. 2d
218 (1953), rev'g. 280 App. Div. 211, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 549 (1952) (con-
tents of incorporated material not known of, and not seen).
0:Spitcaufsky v. State Highway Commission of Missouri, 349 Mo. 117,
159 S.W. 2d 647 (1942) ("weighted tables" on file in commissions office not
seen by plaintiff).
6 Trottier v. M. H. Golden Oonst. Co., 105 Cal. 2d 347, 233 P. 2d 675
(1951).
4Heim v. Speith, 298 Ky. 225, 182 S.W. 2d 635, 637 (1944).
1Jones v. Cunard S.S. Co. Ltd., 238 App. Div. 172, 263 N.Y.S. 769
(1933).
1 Conner v. Manchester Assur. Co., 130 F. 743, (9th Cir. 1904) (insur-
ance policy). Greenspon-Newman Inc. v. Cunard, 227 App. Div. 737, 236
N.Y.S. 809 (1929), as reported in Jones v. Cunard S.S. Co. Ltd., 238
App. Div. 172, 263 N.Y.S. 769 (1933).
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1. Attachment Required
In special situations, the pressure for disclosure of in-
corporated materials has caused the requirement of at-
tachment of the incorporated matters to the body of the
contract to be imposed to facilitate their examination.
7
A chattel mortgage is publicly recorded to serve con-
structive notice of the lien on other creditors. The
instrument recorded is to include a description of the
property encompassed by the mortgage so that third parties
will be able to identify the goods under the mortgage
lien. While a schedule of chattels can be incorporated into
a mortgage by mere reference, to satisfy the requirements
for effective recordation, it must be on file, 8 although it
need not be attached to the mortgage.6 9
When contracting parties are originally in an unequal
bargaining situation, the requirement of attachment may
be imposed in an attempt to avoid an exaggeration of
their status.
To protect owners of insurance from the insurers' prac-
tice of incorporating by reference ambiguous and, mis-
leading clauses containing exceptions and conditions which
are unreasonable and deceptively affect the risk taken by
the insurer, state statutes commonly require that all the
terms of the insurance contract be plainly expressed within
the policy.7" These statutes may disallow incorporation
by reference of any material provisions,7 or they may
'If an attachment is required how secure must it be? It is doubtful
whether a rider to an insurance policy can merely be folded in with the
policy. See Pawson v. Barnevelt, 1 Doug. 12, note 4 (1779). Where a
statute requires a signature or statement to be on the instrument the
general rule is that the validity of an attachment to the document
depends on whether it was so securely affixed that removal would result in
the mutilation of the instrument or leave behind sufficient evidence that
the instrument had been tampered with. Compare Raeuber v. Central
Nat. Bank, 112 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1953), with In re Chinese
Temple Restaurant, 54 F. 2d 945 (D.C. Cir. 1931). Compare OHIo, GFx.
CODE (1910) § 8564 ("instrument . . . must state thereon"), with 13
BALDWIN'S Omno REv. CODE (1958) § 1319.04 ("Sworn statement placed
thereon or attached thereto").
IRaeuber v. Central Nat. Bank, 112 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ohio E.D.
1953).
Commodity Credit Corporation v. Wells, 188 Ga. 287, 3 S.E. 2d 642,
followed in 188 Ga. 434, 4 S.E. 2d 243 (1939) (reference to prior mortgage
which was on record) ; Slimmer v. Meade County Bank, 34 S.D. 147, 147
N.W. 734 (1914).
See 1 COUCH, INSUAN cE (1959), § 3:19, 141.
71E.g., 7 ARiz. REV. STAT. (1956) § 20-1114 (any materials of insurer
Including charter and by-laws) ; 43 CAL. ANxo. CODE (1955) § 10320 (g)
(all materials excepting m&tters like rate tables or classification charts).
[VOL. XXI
1961] INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 15
allow a reference but require attachment of the reference
materials to the policy.72
Retail installment sales legislation also regulates dis-
closure of contract terms by requiring a copy of a sales
contract to be delivered to the buyer at the time of its exe-
cution.7 3 Along with prohibiting various provisions in these
agreements and requiring the use of large type and the
insertion of enumerated clauses, it is provided that the
contracts must contain all the agreements of the parties
with respect to the transaction. 4
Statutes which attempt to advance the disclosure of
contract terms by preventing any incorporation seem un-
necessarily harsh, and they have been liberalized by court
construction.75  Prohibition of all incorporation would
place lengthy conditions involving many particulars in the
body of the contract, carrying with it the danger of di-
verting attention from essential provisions. Also, such a
limitation, would place restrictions upon the types of con-
tracts the parties could enter into.76 On the other hand, a
rule merely requiring attachment does aid in effecting a
disclosure of the full contents of the contract.77
2. Inadequate Disclosure
In the absence of a statute or common, law precedent
requiring an attachment, how should a court handle a
situation where it believes there has been an inadequate
disclosure? Unquestionably it can and will rigidly en-
force the requirement of an intent to incorporate and
insist upon a showing that the disputed materials were
incorporated for the purposes alleged.7" Where exact draft-
ing has made such an approach specious, however, the
court must resort to other rationales.
nE.g., 17 GA. CODE ANN. (1933) § 56-811; 27 McKiNNEY'S CONS. LAWS
OF N.Y. ANN. (1949) § 142.
7 Note, Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 58 Col. L. Rev. 854, 867
(1958). See 19 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 135 (1947).
7, See e.g., 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 83, § 137(a) ; 11 IND. ANN. STAT.
(1951) § 58-902.
7Eastern R. Co. v. Relief Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 420 (1868) (insurance
statute). Accord: Mullaney v. National F. & M. Ins. Co., 118 Mass. 393
(1875) ; Porter v. United States L. Ins. Co., 160 Mass. 183, 35 N.E. 678
(1893). See Newman v. Keys, 12 D. & C. 2d 705 (Pa. 1957) (installment
sales contract does not "contain all agreements" because no reference is
made to judgment note).
76 See 7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 83, § 137(a) (special provision for allowing
incorporation where an "add-on" installment sales contract is desired);
40 MOKINNEY'S CONS. LAWS OF N.Y. ANN. (Supp. 1960) § 402(7). See
text at note 31, supra.
77 But see text at note 91, infra.
78 See text at note 44, supra, and note 86, infra.
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In Carroll Const. Co. v. Smith,79 plaintiff construction
company instituted an action against defendant, a plumber,
who had been hired as a sub-contractor on a school house
project. Defendant looked over the job, talked to the fore-
man, and viewed the plans in the foreman's possession. He
then submitted a bid to do the plumbing and heating
according to "spc.," which was accepted by the company.
Although he never saw the written specifications until he
had completed a portion of the work, the defendant at that
time was informed that under the terms of the specifica-
tions he was expected to furnish the material for the
heating plant. There had been no previous discussion, con-
cerning materials to be used in connection with that por-
tion of the installation, and his bid was under what a
reasonable bid would have been if defendant had contem-
plated providing heating materials; but he had agreed in
writing to perform in accordance with the specifications.
The Supreme Court of Washington held that evidence
concerning the circumstances under which the contract
between the parties was entered into was admissible and
approved the finding of the trial court "that there was no
meeting of minds or contract either oral or in writing
between the parties hereto in regard to the heating job
on said school.""0 The dissent found no ambiguity in the
written contract, and said since defendant admitted de-
livering a bid for work to be done according to the "spc."
he should be held to his contract. It alleged that the
majority of the court was ignoring the plain, unambiguous
language of the instrument and wrongfully resorting to
parol evidence to vary the terms of the agreement."'
In Weiner v. Mercury Artists Corp.,2 plaintiff sued
defendant for breach of an agreement to supply an orches-
tra. Defendant, asserting an agreement to arbitrate, moved
to stay all proceedings in the action pending an arbitration.
The contract between the parties was a one page stand-
ard form without any mention or reference to an agreement
to arbitrate, but it did contain a clause incorporating "the
rules, laws and regulations of the American Federation of
Musicians, and the rules, laws and regulations of the local
in whose jurisdiction the musicians perform" and made
them a part of the contract. Plaintiff, who was not in the
music business, did not see these rules nor was he made
7137 Wash. 2d 322, 223 P. 2d 606 (1950).
- Id., 610.
I A., 613.112284 App. Div. 108, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 570 (1954).
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aware of any of their contents. They consisted of 207 pages
of printed matter in which, somewhere between pages 62
and 66, there was a lengthy provision for arbitration to be
handled by the Executive Board of the Federation.
The New York Appellate Division, First Department,
denied plaintiff the right to arbitration. It followed a clear
trend in New York toward requiring a specific mention
of arbitration within the body of the agreement, 3 This
makes a mere referral to an instrument containing an
arbitration provision ineffective since "[t]he intent must be
clear to render arbitration the exclusive remedy; parties
are not to be led into arbitration unwittingly through
subtleties." 4  The requirements for application of this
strict doctrine in arbitration cases are by no means clear
but courts employing it have emphasized: the lack of an
expectation that a provision calling for arbitration would
be likely to be within the incorporated materials;8 5 the
length of the extrinsic documents referred to;" the fact
that the party suing to avoid arbitration was not a member
of the association whose rules they had incorporated and
that he had never seen the incorporated materials which
had not been attached to the contract;87 the fact that the
8 See American Rail & Steel Co. v. India iSupply Mission, 308 N.Y. 577,
127 N.E. 2d 562 (1955) ; Albrecht Chemical Co. v. Anderson Trading Corp.,
298 N.Y. 437, 84 N.E. 2d 625 (1954).
Riverdale Faibrics v. Tillinghast-Stiles Co., 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E. 2d
104, 106 (1954) (3 justices dissenting), noted 39 Minn. L. Rev. 311 (1955),
29 iSt. Johns L. Rev. 135 (1955). C!. Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.'S.T.
Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 288, 174 P. 2d 441 (1946).
See Re General Silk Importing Co., 200 App. Div. 786, 194 N.Y.S. 15
(1922) aff'd. without opinion 234 N.Y. 513, 138 N.E. 427 (1922). Accord:
Re 'Bachman, E. & Co., 204 App. Div. 282, 187 N.Y.S. 879 (1923).
Weiner v. Mercury Artists Corp., 284 App. Div. 108, 130 N.Y.S. 2d
570 (1954); Northridge Corp. Sec. No. I v. 32nd Ave. Const. Corp., 139
N.Y.S. 2d 37 (Sup. Ct. 1955). C1. Dorf v. Taya, 194 App. Div. 894, 192
N.Y.S. 923 (1920), aff'd. 234 N.Y. 525, 138 N.E. 432 (1920) (bill of lading
providing it "shall be governed by the law of the flag of the vessel
carrying the goods" did not incorporate statute of limitations of Spain
although the carrying ship flew Spanish flag).TWestern Vegetable Oil Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 141 F. 2d
235 (9th Cir. 1944). In Re General Silk Importing Co., the court found
that respondent was not a member of the Raw Silk Association of
America and refused to require him to proceed to arbitration under a
contract which was to be governed "by raw silk rules" adopted by 'the
Silk Association. Subsequently it appeared that both parties had been
members of the Association and respondent was expelled from the
organization for refusing to participate in arbitration. See Gerseta Corp.
v. Silk Assoc. of America, 200 App. Div. 890, 192 N.Y.S. 370 (1922), app.
dismissed without opinion, 233 N.Y. 544, 135 N.E. 911 (1922), where a
peremptory mandamus directing reinstatement of Gerseta Corporation to
membership in the Association was reversed, two members of the court
holding -that a factual question was presented on whether it was gen-
erally known in the trade that contracts such es were involved in this
case required arbitration. Finally, in Re General Silk Importing Co.,
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arbitration was not to be carried on by an independent
agency;8" and the fact that the form of the incorporation
tended to hide the idea that arbitration was being adopted.s9
Under the circumstances faced in the two cases recited
above, the courts appear to have reached just results by
invalidating the incorporation, but it may be suggested
that the theories utilized in their decisions were not wholly
satisfactory. In the first case there was merit to the
dissent's argument that parol evidence was being used
to contradict the terms of an unambiguous written con-
tract. In the second case the court tended to restrict its
200 App. Div. 786, 194 N.Y.S. 15 (1922), aff'd. without opinion 234 N.Y.
513, 138 N.E. 427 (1922), the Appellate Division reversed an order of
the trial court requiring arbitration since while the parties were mem-
bers of the Association neither was a member of the raw silk division
which was the only division for which arbitration was compulsory. See
also M'Connell & Reed v. Smith, [1911] S.C. 635, noted 48 Scot. L. R. 564,
1 Scot. Lt. 33 (clause in sales note that all disputes are to be governed
by Glasgow Flour Trade Association did not adopt provisions for arbitm-
tion where buyer was not a member of the Association and' had not
received reasonable notice of the provision). Cf. Scott's Valley Fruit
Exchange v. Growers Refrigeration Co., 81 Cal. App. 2d 492, 184 P. 2d
183 (1947) (limitation of liability in warehouse receipt). But see Level
Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken & Co., 305 N.Y. 82, 111 N.E. 218 (1953),
rev'g. 200 App. Div. 211, 112 N.Y.S. 2d 549 (1952) (dissent by Desmond J.,
concurred in by Fuld, J.) ('Buyer, who was never informed that the pro-
visions of the contract required arbitration and who was not a member
of any textile association, failed by his own ignorance to understand the
significance of the contract clause which incorporated the "Standard
Cotton Textile Salesnote.") ; Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co.,
77 F. Supp. 364 (Nab. 1948) (Contract executed by broker for both
parties contained the notation "Rules National Soybean Processors Asso-
ciation," which rules provided for arbitration under the rules of the
American Arbitration Association. Plaintiff was not a member of the
Processor's Association.)
8 Weiner v. Mercury Artists Corp., 284 App. Dlv. 108, 130 N.Y.S. 2d 570
(1954),.
Riverdale Fabrics Corp v. Tillinghast Stiles Co., 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E.
2d 104, 41 A.L.R. 2d 867 (1954), rev'g. 281 App. Div. 983, 121 N.Y.S. 2d
261 (1953) (words used appeared designed to avoid any resistence that
might arise if arbitration were brought to the attention of the party).
In Western Vegetable Oil Co. v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 141 F. 2d 235
(9th Cir. 1944), the part of a form contract which specifically referred
to arbitration had been deleted from the contract. The Court found that
the deletion was presumptive evidence of an intention to abrogate the
arbitration provision from the contract.
A favorite notation made by courts which do not hold parties to in-
corporated arbitration clauses is that if both parties had actually Intended
to provide for arbitration they merely had to add a statement to that
effect Into the contract. See Re General Silk Importing Co., 198 App. Div.
16, 189 N.Y.S. 391 (1921). This argument was countered in Wilson & Co.
v. Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364, 373 (Neb. 1948), where the
court termed that position utterly untenable ("If any of the rules were
not to be operative their omission ought, Indeed, to have been expressly
incorporated Into the memorandum by appropriate language. But having
adopted by adequate descriptive language the entire group of rules, the
addition of such a phrase as, 'and we intend to include Rule 115,' would
appear to be the ultimate in supererogation.").
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reasoning to the situation where the incorporated provi-
sion contains an arbitration clause. It followed other courts
which have treated arbitration as a unique problem around
which a group of special rules should be developed.90
There is no real difference between a contract incorporating
reference material which includes an arbitration provision,
or a provision for a short statute of limitations, or a
requirement of written notice to be given within a stated
time as a condition precedent for suit. In each case a party
may be unaware of material restrictions contained within
the incorporated provisions, yet he may be held to them
because he has signed a contract. Any reasoning employed
to avoid this result in cases where its application would
be unjust should have widespread use. What rule, then,
should be applied where a party claims he has not seen,
read, nor expected the material clauses contained in the
provisions which were incorporated in the contract?
One way to avoid the problem of a party's not seeing an
incorporation would be to adopt universally the require-
ment of attachment of all incorporated matter to the
body of the contract.9' Such a rule would place a heavy
burden on the party preparing the contract and nullify
major advantages of the incorporation doctrine. Also, it
would probably not effect a substantial increase in the
knowledge of incorporated materials, for a layman is still
unlikely to wade through a bulky reference even if it is
at his disposal. To require a summary of the matters in-
corporated to appear in the body of the contract might be
a more effective solution, for it is the awareness of the
contents of the incorporated provisions rather than the
I In Level Export Corp. v. Wolz, Aiken & Co., 280 App. Div. 211, 112
N.Y.S. 2d 549, 551 (1952), the Appellate Division of New York emphasized
the difference between an incorporated provision for arbitration, which
abridged the fundamental right to a judicial determination, and other
provisions of "lesser moment."
The N. Y. Arbitration Act, CrvIL P.AncE ACT § 1449, CLvENGE.'s
PRACTICE MANUAL (1960), does require a contract to arbitrate a future
dispute to be in writing. But the special treatment of arbitration cases
does not seem to follow solely from this mandate, or from any jealousy
which the courts might have towards a competing system of settling dis-
putes. A more likely reason for this separate approach is that because of
the specialized nature of the arbitration contract, arbitration precedents
are only considered, although an incorporation issue is presented.
91 See Emerson Radio and Phonograph Corp. v. Illustrated Prioducts
Corp., 178 N.Y.S. 2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1958) ("A provision for arbitration may
not be . . . incorporated by reference to an extrinsic document which is
neither exhibited nor attached to the contract itself") (dictum). Cf.
Charles .S. Fields, Inc. v. American Hydrotherm Corp., 5 App. Div. 647,
174 N.Y.S. 2d 184 (1958).
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actual view of them which is important.9 2 Such a re-
quirement, however, would be likely to lead to stereotyped
vague recitals which would involve the parties in litiga-
tion over the adequacy of the clause's coverage. It would
also place an added strain, on the draftsman and prescribe
a rigid rule of law in an area where each case should re-
ceive individual consideration.
It is surprising that where courts find that a party
should be relieved from an unseen and unexpected in-
corporated provision, they do not unanimously turn to the
exceptions to the general contract rule that a person is
bound by what he signs regardless of whether he has read
it, and extend and strengthen their application in the
incorporation situation. Traditionally, if a party erred in
thinking he knew the contents of the writing he signed, he
has made a unilateral mistake. If the other party had
reason to know of this error and did not make him aware
of the true state of facts, he cannot hold him to the con-
tract. And a party alleging a mistake can, produce parol
evidence, not to contradict the terms of the written con
tract, but to show that the person he contracted with
knowingly took advantage of his mistake. 9 Also, if a
party signing an instrument without reading it was in-
duced to do so by the misrepresentations of the other
party to the contract, the contract is voidable by the
mistaken party. 4 Would it be too radical to say that if a
person drafts a contract and includes a general reference
to materials he has not attached or explained, he repre-
sents by his silence that the incorporated matter contains
nothing which would not be reasonably expected by the
other party?
CONCLUSION
Commercial contracts are complicated and complex, and
in drafting an agreement there is a tendency to use a
handy form. The longer an instrument the more likely
an incorporation becomes.
Almost all the litigation involving incorporation is the
result of bad draftmanship. The law relating to incorpo-
9 (f. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y. 2d 534, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 418,
141 N.E. 2d 812 (1957) (notice of Incorporation of restriction on stock
transfer upheld).
913 CORBN, CONTRACrs (1960) §§ 607, 610, pp. 662-63, 692-97. Compare
C.N. Monroe Mfg. Co. v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 449 (Mich. 1956),
with Carrol Const. Co. v. Smith, 37 Wash. 2d 322, 223 P. 2d 606 (1950).
13 CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1960) § 607, 666-68. See, e.g., Mutual Savings
Life Ins. Co. v. Hines, 96 Ga. App. 442, 100 S.E. 2d 466 (1957); Rood
v. Midwest Matrix Mart., 350 Mich. 559, 87 N.W. 2d 186 (1957).
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ration requires an, intent to incorporate, and the courts
will not hesitate to strictly apply this requirement to
prevent one of the parties from making use of the doctrine
to gain an unfair advantage.
The problems of manifestation of intent and adequacy
of disclosure are interrelated. In the absence of a special
circumstance which may require an attachment of in-
corporated material, a clear manifestation of intent as to
what is being incorporated will go far in meeting the
need for disclosure. Similarly, adequate disclosure of
incorporated terms should greatly influence a court towards
a finding of an intent to incorporate where the language
used is ambiguous. If the standards for manifesting an
intent to incorporate or adequate disclosure are not met,
the fact that they were unwittingly unfulfilled by a care-
less draftsman will not vary a finding of no incorporation
unless a court will bend to find the true intent of the party
by implication. A good draftsman will never place this bur-
den on the courts. He will in advance draft out the problems
that could arise from his incorporation by making his
intent to incorporate clear, detailing the scope and pur-
pose of his incorporation, checking the need for attachment
of the incorporated material, searching out and avoiding
any conflicts with provisions of the main contract, and
clearly communicating the substance of the reference
material to the other party to the contract.
